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ABSTRACT: 
France’s long history of centralized governance has generated debates as to what powers should 
remain with the State and what powers should devolve to sub-national governments. To ameliorate 
the fragmentation resulting from the small size of France’s 36,000 plus municipalities, called 
communes, the State authorized the creation of general-purpose, inter-communal public 
institutions to perform municipal functions on behalf of the communes on a greater economy of 
scale. The article examines the trajectory that led to the creation in 2010 of the métropole, or 
metropolis, the most recent of these inter-communal bodies that is designed to undertake public 
functions in large metropolitan areas.  The article first describes France’s territorial organization 
of sub-national units and the decentralization movements that resulted in the devolution of more 
power from the State to local and regional governments. The article presents the rationale for this 
decentralization and analyzes the conditions that led to the State’s transfer of more power to the 
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metropolitan level of governance. It concludes that the cooperative arrangements among the 
communes, structured by inter-communal bodies, was instrumental to the creation of the métropole 
with legal status. An examination of the French experience with metropolitan governance should 
prove helpful to other entities or individuals engaged in the formation and evaluation of 
metropolitan governments. 
KEY WORDS: municipal, metropolitan, metropolis, inter-communal, territorial, governance, 
economic development, urban, cooperation, innovation, sustainability, fragmentation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As powerful economic drivers in a globalized world, cities have come under greater 
scrutiny.1  In the United States, 100 metropolitan areas generate seventy-five percent of the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).2  Given the important role cities also play in the 
improvement of social cohesion and the urban physical environment, scholars have asked whether 
cities have been granted the powers they need to perform the myriad roles agglomeration has cast 
upon them.3  Because metropolitan governance may achieve greater economic and political 
interdependency, an analysis of the new modes of regulating it should be made.4 This article 
addresses the evolutionary process that led to the creation of the French métropole (metropolis) 
with legal status.  
The French metropolis leaves open several questions worth exploring.  Assuming this form 
of urban governance increases metropolitan economic competitiveness, might other countries 
explore it as a model for their global cities to explore?  If so, would these cities follow an 
evolutionary path toward metropolitan-wide governance similar to the French metropolis 
trajectory?   
In France, a debate over what powers should be devolved to local governments has been 
ongoing since the 1960s when a movement to decentralize national powers began in earnest.5  The 
overly centralized State governmental apparatus came under attack as a reason why French cities, 
with the exception of Paris, failed to compete effectively in European and global markets.6  By 
concentrating resources in the center close to the national seats of power, this centralization 
thwarted the development of provincial urban areas.7 Centralization of power has also been 
attributed with stifling innovation from those in the closest position to find solutions to problems.8  
For a number of years France has experimented with urban governance on a metropolitan 
basis through inter-municipal cooperation.  Experience with different forms of inter-municipal 
structures led to the recent creation of the métropole, or metropolis.9 This metropolitan-wide public 
body constitutes a model worth examining for its applicability to other global cities.   
The article first describes the traditional French system of centralized governance and the 
sub-national governmental entities comprising it.  Part II of the article then traces the 
decentralization movements that led to the evolution of metropolises through the enactment of 
various French laws from the 1960s through 2015.  It highlights the driving forces through three 
decentralization movements that reallocated some national powers to the regional and local levels 
of governance. The article analyzes the different types of urban governance structures that emerged 
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or changed during the decentralization movements, including the métropole.  Part III of the article 
points out the reasons and beliefs that underlie the French decentralization movements.  Part IV 
then analyzes the factors that were instrumental in the achievement of greater metropolitan 
governance in France.  This part also explores the applicability of these French conditions to 
potential developments in support of metropolitan-wide governments in the United States. 
 
I. TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF FRANCE’S SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 
 Following a feudal period in which each French province possessed territorial power 
divided among land owners, the King’s agents, and the Catholic Church, French monarchs, as 
exemplified by Louis XIV (1648-1715), sought to consolidate power through State intervention in 
the economic sphere and the imposition of political uniformity over the provinces.10  The French 
revolution, which began in 1789, resulted in the destruction of the monarchy and the introduction 
of a republican state in which the people exercise sovereign powers.11  The National Assembly’s 
Act of 14 December 1789 established a new territorial organization of municipalities, known as 
communes, and departments (départements).12    
 
A. COMMUNES 
Based on ecclesiastical parishes dating back to the tenth century, communes were 
authorized to be formed with elected bodies and public law status.13  Local relations developed 
within cities and certain rural districts led to the formation of communes.14  Today over 36,500 
communes exist with 550,000 local councilors, causing considerable municipal power 
fragmentation.15  A commune may be a city with over two million inhabitants such as Paris, a 
town of 10,000 people, or a small hamlet with less than 100 persons.16  Communes bear 
responsibility, in particular, for the following matters:  primary schools and pre-schools, local 
roads, local police, urbanism, housing, cemeteries, local social services, local transportations, and 
gas and electricity networks.17  
 
B. DEPARTMENTS 
 The territory of the Republic was artificially divided into departments in 1789 to oversee 
general State administration throughout France.18  The term “department” was given to these 
administrative units to signify that they were part of a larger whole.19 They replaced ancient régime 
provinces to strengthen national unity.20  The ninety-six departments in mainland France are 
sufficiently large enough to provide efficient territorial administration, but not large enough to 
challenge the central state.21  Napoleon Bonaparte’s government instituted the state prefect (préfet) 
to represent the central government in each department.22  The prefects exercised control over 
local communes, implemented central government policies, and maintained public order.23  
Despite the existence of an assembly, called the General Council, at the departmental level, the 
prefect until the mid-nineteenth century wielded the State’s full power; the exercise of the council’s 
limited powers were subject to the prefect’s approval.24   The departments’ functions include social 
services for children, handicapped individuals, and elderly persons; secondary education; middle 
schools (colleges); roads; school buses; local development; water protections; museums; libraries; 
historical buildings; culture; and support for inter-municipal associations.25 
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C. REGIONS 
 The regions, first instituted in 1959 as territorial communities, were established as State 
administrative districts to oversee economic development and coordinate national policies.26 The 
regions cover larger geographical areas than the departments, and in 2016, the regions were 
reduced in number from twenty-two to thirteen.27  In theory, matters deemed to be strategic fall 
under the preserve of the regions.28  The regions lack the status and power given to departments, 
but they play a leading role in economic development, transportation, and territorial planning.29  
They oversee professional education and high schools, other than the management of teachers and 
programs,30 and they exercise some competencies in the support of universities and research 
centers.31  They have been given responsibility for transportation functions outside of cities such 
as regional train service.32  Some regions own transportation facilities that include airports, canals, 
and river ports.33  In addition, environmental protection falls within their domain.34 Regions have 
also been active in promoting trans-border and international cooperation.35  They possess no 
legislative power and did not become democratically elected bodies until 1986.36 
 
D. INTER-COMMUNAL BODIES 
 In addition to the three layers of government that fall below the national level of 
governance, the so-called “territorial collectivities”, the communes delegate authority to various 
inter-communal bodies that assist the communes in undertaking cooperative activities among 
themselves.37  When a policy or infrastructure would benefit several communes, municipal 
councils may pool resources and turn to these inter-communal structures to undertake the project 
or service more effectively through economies of scale.38 In effect, these inter-communal 
authorities compensate for the inadequacies of the communal structure.39  These entities, which 
may undertake one or multi-functions, are comparable to public authorities in the United States 
that usually provide only one service thought to be best performed on a regional, as opposed to a 
municipal, basis.  Like public authorities in the United States, these inter-communal bodies 
function without representatives directly elected by the citizenry.40  In France, however, the 
communes indirectly elect the councilors for the inter-communal bodies.41 Representatives of each 
individual commune provide input on the agenda developed by these public institutions.42 
 Inter-communal structures may be classified as those without fiscal power and those 
granted fiscal power.  The traditional syndicates of communes fall into the first category.  Lacking 
the power to tax, the syndicates depend upon the communes for financial contributions.43  
Syndicates may be created to perform a single function, most commonly waste management and 
the supply of water or energy, or they may deliver several services.44   
 Tax-raising inter-communal structures have been created as inter-communal public 
corporations (établissements publics de co-opération intercommunale-EPCI).45  Several different 
types of these public corporations have been created, namely, (1) the community of communes 
(communauté de communes), which operates primarily among rural communes; (2) the 
community of agglomeration (communauté d’agglomération), aimed at middle-sized cities and 
their suburbs and towns; the urban community (communauté urbaine) formed for larger cities and 
their suburbs; and the new métropole, which has been created to operate in France’s major cities.46  
These permanent organizations provide “inter-communal services such as fire-fighting, waste 
disposal, transport, economic development, [and] housing.”47 The inter-communal authorities 
manage some services previously under the domain of the communes, such as garbage collection 
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or transportation, but by law they are also mandated to oversee “other areas such as economic 
planning and development, housing projects, or environmental protection.”48  
E. METROPOLISES 
 Law No. 2010-1563 of 16 December 2010 created the métropole as a new inter-communal 
public institution.49 It was envisioned as a body that would bring several municipalities together 
to undertake developments covering “economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social 
development of their territory in order to improve their competitiveness and cohesion.”50 The 
metropolis was conceived as a step beyond the existing inter-communal bodies in that it was 
created to address large urbanized areas and make them economically competitive on a European 
and global basis.51 Planning, in particular, was laid at the doorstep of the metropolis: it “is fully 
associated with the drafting, revision and modification of planning and planning diagrams and 
documents for planning, economic development and innovation, transport and the environment, 
[and] higher education.”52 
 The metropolis is granted powers in place of its member municipalities in the areas of 
economic development, tourism, culture, higher education, research institutions, research 
programs, and in the development and management of a range of facilities, including those relating 
to tourism, ports, airports, and sports.53  It is empowered to develop metropolitan plans, create 
public spaces, operate telecommunications networks, facilitate mobility, establish housing policy, 
and improve the built housing stock.54  The State has also authorized metropolises to provide a 
range of services, including those relating to sanitation and water, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, 
fire and rescue, waste disposal, and the distribution of electricity and gas.55  Metropolises have 
been granted extensive powers relating to the protection and development of the environment that 
include such disparate areas as air pollution, noise pollution, energy control and demand, 
renewable energy production, climate-air-energy plans, flood prevention, beaches, and aquatic 
environments.56  Other powers may be delegated to metropolises by the State, or by agreement 
with the department or region.57   
II. FRENCH TERRITORIAL DECENTRALIZATION 
A. FIRST STAGE OF DECENTRALIZATION (1982-1983)  
 Until the 1980s, the exercise of governmental power in France was centralized.58 In 
classical French republicanism, the role played by local authorities did not promote democracy or 
represent community interests; rather, it was supposed “to integrate the periphery into a highly 
centralized system.”59  Government signified sovereignty and its affairs were carried out at the 
center, not at the fringes.60  In practice, powerful local notables obtained resources from the central 
state in exchange for providing valuable local information.61  In 1981, the election of a socialist 
President, François Mitterrand, led to the first so-called decentralization movement that made 
changes to the distribution of power and resources from the national government.62   
 The Act of 2 March 1982 introduced three important changes:  (1) the administrative 
stewardship of the department prefect, who had served as both the department’s executive and 
State representative until 1982, was replaced by a checks and balances system in which the 
administrative courts and the regional courts of audit worked with the department prefect to 
oversee territorial governmental functions;63 (2) the executive power exercised by the departments 
and regions was transferred from the prefect to the president of the departments and regions, the 
president being elected by the council of the department or region;64 and (3) regions were officially 
granted legal status, and the regional councils, first created in 1972, became elected bodies with 
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enhanced decision-making powers.65  In 1984, the French local government civil service was 
created in connection with the decentralization process, and it includes employment in the three 
layers of sub-national government: commune, department, and region.66 
 Until the 1982 decentralization measures, the prefect served as both the department’s State 
representative and executive.67  The transfer of executive power from the prefect to the president 
of the department or region required a separation of those services of a State nature that stayed 
under the prefect’s authority and those newly devolved to the president of the department or 
region.68  The 1982 reform has been characterized as involving both decentralization and de-
concentration.69  Decentralization entails the vertical transfer of State power to elected local 
political authorities in specific areas whereas de-concentration involves the internal horizontal 
shifting of central powers so as to ensure continued State control.70   
 To prevent the undermining of the State’s influence through its representatives in the 
department, de-concentration measures were implemented to strengthen the authority of the State’s 
agent, the prefect, who exercises authority over representatives of the various State ministries in 
the department.71 The prefect chairs local administrative committees and remains the only 
authority empowered to commit State expenditures in the department under his jurisdiction.72 A 
prefect must undertake a number of different roles—she can submit local council acts to the 
administrative courts if she deems them illegal; she implements and enforces legislation; and she 
must prepare State services in her department for all eventualities, including natural disasters.73  
The prefect must explain State policy to local constituents and provide data as needed, roles that 
cast this official into a public relations officer.  At the same time, a prefect must ensure that the 
department’s elected officials do not encroach on the State’s powers.74  Successful prefects serve 
as problem solvers, mediators, and communication links between the State and territorial bodies.75 
 The role of the prefect is alien, however, to the system of local government in the United 
States where state governments possess their own distinct powers, separate from the federal 
government.76  States create their own local governments as they see fit and delegate powers to 
them.77  In most cases the locality exercises such delegated powers on its own accord.78  In France, 
two separate administrations work side by side in the departments and regions—one represents the 
territorial body and the other is comprised of State representatives.79  
 
B. SECOND STAGE OF DECENTRALIZATION (2003-2004) 
 Constitutional reform constituted the first phase of the second decentralization 
movement.80 The Constitution (17 March 2003) granted constitutional recognition to the regions 
and included them as one of the four territorial authorities.81  In addition, to making the regions 
permanent, the Constitution recognized authorities with a “special status,” a category including 
the different public inter-communal bodies (EPICs).82 Further, the Constitution made specific 
reference to the decentralized organization of the French Republic,83 introducing the principle of 
financial autonomy for the sub-national authorities.84  Reference was also made in the Constitution 
to future merging of the sub-national authorities into larger units.85  
 The Act on the Decentralized Organization of the Republic established the different tiers 
of sub-national authorities as part of France’s institutional organization and guaranteed their 
competency in certain areas, enabling these territorial bodies to fulfill their responsibilities.86  
Three other significant acts were passed during the first decentralization phase: “[t]he Act on the 
financial autonomy of sub-national government tiers. . . , the Act on experimentation by local 
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governments, [footnote omitted] and the Act on local referendums. . . .”87 The latter Act allowed 
local referenda.88 
 The second legislative phase began with the enactment of the 13 August 2004 Act that 
provided for significant transfers of State responsibilities to the sub-national governments and their 
cooperative structures, the so-called “functional reforms.”89 The decentralization reforms 
established three general areas of decision-making (blocs de compétences) to be carried out by the 
different sub-national tiers: immediate proximity, intermediate proximity, and strategic.90 Matters 
deemed to be strategic lie in the competence of the regions: “economic development, vocational 
training, infrastructure, some secondary education, some transport (and regional rail services since 
2002), with additional responsibilities in culture and the environment.”91  Matters of intermediate 
proximity fall under the jurisdiction of the departments that deliver major services including social 
assistance, social services, roads, and some secondary education.92 The communes and various 
inter-communal bodies are granted jurisdiction over matters of immediate proximity, which 
include low-level social assistance, planning permits, and waste disposal.93 
 In practice, the spheres of competence are overlapping and not always respected as the 
communes, departments, and regions compete with each other and design their policies to appeal 
to their electorates.94  Moreover, because no formal hierarchy exists among the sub-national units, 
no single authority can exercise control over another or prevent the adoption of policies in 
competition with its own priorities.95 French regions, for example, are dependent upon the co-
operation of the geographically smaller sub-national authorities for the successful outcome of their 
own policies.96  
C. THIRD STATE OF DECENTRALIZATION (2010-2015)    
 Various deficiencies in the performance of local governmental functions continued to 
persist even after the second phase of decentralization.  A decree by President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
under date of 22 October 2008, established a committee for local government reform, appointed 
former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur as chair, and stated the need for such report as follows: 
The time to study and decide on a profound reform of local government has come.  
Everyone agrees that the current situation is unsatisfactory:  proliferation of 
decision-making levels, confusion in the division of powers, lack of clarity in the 
allocation of resources, . . . uniformity of the rules applied to all the collectivities 
whatever their situation, complication resulting from all the efforts made rightly to 
incite the communities to cooperate with each other. This results in multiple 
disadvantages: cumbersome procedures, increased costs, ineffective public 
interventions and ultimately, distance from citizens.97 
 The Balladur Committee report (Report), published in March 2009, in effect, announced a 
third stage of French decentralization.98  The Report set forth reasons in support of further State 
decentralization. Foremost, was the recognition that France’s urban areas needed to be structured 
so as to enable them to compete effectively in European and global markets.99  The Report 
described the existing territorial organization as complex, costly, and deficient in fulfilling the 
needs of constituents.100  Although the Republic’s governmental structure had accomplished 
national unity and deepened local rights and freedom through previous decentralization measures, 
the organization of local authorities had grown more complex through the multiplication of 
institutions of inter-municipal cooperation since 1999.101 The failure to examine the type of 
competencies exercised by different local governmental units as well as their funding, had resulted, 
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according to the Report, in a loss of efficiency with respect to public actions and services, 
unnecessary taxpayer burdens, and a lack of transparency.102  
 The Report further decried the failure to reduce territorial fragmentation, pointing out that 
between 1950 and 2007 France had only decreased the number of municipalities by 5% whereas 
the reduction of municipalities during that time period was 41% in Germany and 79% in the United 
Kingdom.103  It pointed out that structures of territorial administration had not adapted to urban 
growth and lifestyles marked by “mobility and a strong demand for market services, transportation, 
family services, culture and recreation.”104  The division of powers between the mayors of 
communes and the councilors general of the departments made it extremely difficult to develop 
coherent urban policy.105  The Report noted that “with a few exceptions no competence is 
specialized by level of territorial administration and most are shared between local authorities or 
between them and the State.”106 
 Finding the territorial administrative structures to be too numerous and fragmented, the 
Report lamented the failure of the 36,000 communes to merge and remarked that their geographical 
boundary lines often defied rationality.107 The statutory diversity of the communities of 
communes, communities of agglomeration, and urban communities resulted not only in 
complexity and rigidity, but also failed to produce the economies of scale expected. Concern was 
expressed that the public institutions of inter-communal cooperation (EPCI), some of which 
exercised powers of a quasi-general competence, remained with indirect suffrage.108   
 The Report concluded that the regions had not accomplished the objectives sought by their 
creation, stating “that their relatively high numbers, limited financial weight and scattered skills 
are not in keeping with their role in the ongoing reorganization of State, which favors the regional 
level.”109  Departments were criticized as poorly adapted to meet the needs of highly urbanized 
areas, and cantons, smaller units within the departments, were described as obsolete.110 Equally as 
important, was the assessment that institutional coordination between the regions and departments 
had not met with real success.111  
 The Report found that the simplification of local governmental structures sought might 
result in two levels of administration: a regional level dedicated to the management of territorial 
development and activities, and an inter-communal level to meet the service needs of the 
population.112 Laying the foundation for the métropole, the Report indicated that much thinking 
had gone into the creation of the “commune of the twenty-first century,” which was described as 
a new local authority grounded at the inter-communal level of governance.113  In the spirit of 
transparency, the Report’s authors opined that such inter-communality could not be fully realized 
without making fundamental changes to the existing sub-national structures, including a 
redefinition of the departments’ role.114  
 The Report favored granting general competence to municipalities, much like the role of 
municipalities in the United States, called general purpose governments, which provide a 
comprehensive set of governmental services to protect their residents’ health and welfare.115  It 
advocated that the exercise of specialized skills should be delegated to other governmental entities.  
This proposed structure was found advantageous in that several localities would be precluded from 
exercising identical powers within the same territory.116  
 Finally, the Report’s Introduction concluded that local governance structural reforms 
would be ineffectual without new fiscal measures and a clearer tax system.117  Although the 
decentralization reforms in 2003 had established the principle of financial autonomy for local 
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authorities, they remained unable to finance their expenditures in a complete way.118  Uncertainties 
remained as to the extent of local financial autonomy, and an excess of cross-financing continued 
even as local expenditures continued to increase.119 
 The Balladur Committee recommended twenty proposals that covered a number of areas 
of concern, including suggested structural local government reforms, electoral rules, local 
government finance, and the creation of new forms of metropolitan governance.120 To increase 
efficiency, the Report proposed reducing the number of regions from twenty-two to fifteen and 
merging departments into larger entities.121 It proposed the expansion of institutions of inter-
municipal cooperation to cover all of France’s territory and argued in favor of the direct election 
of these bodies.122 The Report recommended that only communes and the EPCI be favored by the 
principle of “free administration of local authorities,” which authorizes local authorities to 
intervene in areas as they chose.123  It suggested that clarifications be made with respect to the 
division of responsibilities between the State and local authorities and between the regions and the 
departments.124  It favored making clearer the areas in which either the regions or the departments 
would have exclusive or primary jurisdiction.125 Proposal number eleven envisioned that the clause 
of general competence should rest at the municipal or metropolitan level of governance with 
specialized competencies to be exercised by the departments and regions.126 The Report favored a 
reduction of State field services.127  
 The Report’s significant accomplishment lay in creating the intellectual foundation for the 
métropole as a new metropolitan based, inter-communal body to exercise competencies transferred 
to it from communes, departments, and regions.128 The Report advocated removing the communes’ 
status as autonomous local authorities, but well aware that removal of the communes’ general 
competencies would spark opposition, it left open an alternative plan that would allow the 
communes to retain their legal status within the metropolitan framework.129 The new metropolises 
were envisioned as delivering city-wide services, including the social and welfare services 
traditionally delivered by departments. The Report proposed that the first group of eleven 
metropolises be created by 2014.130 The Report also urged the creation of a “Grand Paris,” a large 
new metropolis with a jurisdiction encompassing the City of Paris and several departments.131 
 President Sarkozy initiated the first piece of legislation to implement some of the Balladur 
Report recommendations.132 The Law on the Reform of Territorial Authorities of 16 December 
2010, known as RCT, provided for the creation of a métropole as a public body through agreement 
between and among public institutions in inter-communal co-operation and granted it powers of 
taxation.133  Limited to large, urban areas of more than 500,000 inhabitants, the RCT granted the 
status of metropolis to bodies so created.134 Further aims of the 2010 law were to clarify 
competences among the sub-national levels of government, simplify their structures, and facilitate 
local taxation reform.135  The City of Nice became France’s first official metropolis pursuant to 
the 16 December 2010 law.136  
 Although the third stage of decentralization lost momentum following the enactment of the 
16 December 2010 law, the election of President François Hollande in 2012 led to the enactment 
of three new pieces of legislation.137  The first law known as the MAPTAM law (modernisation 
de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles), promulgated on 27 January 2014, 
clarified the responsibilities of local and regional authorities.138    Secondly, MAPTAM created a 
new legal status for the metropolises.139  By affirming the role of the metropolis as a specific 
regime, MAPTAM reinforced the importance of urban dynamics.140 MAPTAM provided for the 
creation of a metropolis in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille as special cases with specific provisions that 
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related to them only.141  MAPTAM also provided for the creation of a larger number of so-called 
“common law” metropolises, which are defined as  
a public institution of intercommunal co-operation with own taxation uniting 
several communes in one piece and without enclave within a space of solidarity to 
elaborate and to lead together a project of development and economic, ecological, 
educational development, cultural and social aspects of their territory in order to 
improve their cohesion and competitiveness and to contribute to sustainable and 
inclusive development of the regional territory. It promotes metropolitan economic 
functions, its transport networks and its university resources, research and 
innovation, in a spirit of regional and interregional cooperation and with a view to 
balanced territorial development.142 
 MAPTAM reformed the status of metropolises first authorized by the law of 16 December 
2010.143  It authorized the creation of a number of metropolises in large urban areas by providing 
for the transformation of public institutions of inter-communal cooperation with taxation powers 
into metropolises.144  A metropolis, the most integrated form of local inter-communality, may be 
formed by decree in territories with a population of more than 400,000 that are located in urban 
areas of more than 650,000 inhabitants.145  Metropolises may be initiated by city decision 
makers.146  As of January 1, 2018, nineteen cities have been reorganized as metropolises under 
MAPTAM’s general provisions for metropolises, and Paris and Aix-Marseille-Provence have been 
formed as metropolises with special status.147  The Lyon metropolis, also established with a special 
status under MAPTAM, possesses a more integrated metropolitan form and is not an inter-
communality.148 
 A third piece of legislation, the Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République 
(NOTRe), promulgated on 7 August 2015, entrusted the regions with new competencies and 
redefined the competencies granted to each territorial collectivity.149 NOTRe removed the general 
jurisdiction clause for departments and regions, thereby eliminating their right to intervene in all 
subject areas.150  Instead, the clause of general competence was vested exclusively in the commune 
so as to “avoid unnecessary spending when multiple levels of communities are competing in a 
single area of action.”151  The NOTRe reforms further increased the power of the inter-
communalities in anticipation of the further integration of public operations on an inter-municipal 
scale.152  Another law (law of 16 January 2015), which took effect on January 1, 2016, reduced 
the number of regions from twenty-two to thirteen.153 
 
III. RATIONALE FOR METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 
 The previously discussed Balladur Report provided a number of reasons in favor of the 
decentralization of power from the State to sub-national entities, including metropolises.  The view 
that economic competitiveness could best be achieved by granting more power to sub-national 
public institutions constituted a widely accepted theory for decentralization.154  The enhancement 
of democracy that could be achieved by granting greater freedom of management to local officials 
embodied an equally compelling argument.155    
 Metropolitan government has not taken hold in the United States due to a preference for 
localism.156  Municipal officials generally oppose the creation of a metropolitan-wide government 
because they do not want to lose any authority.157 In addition, suburban and higher-income 
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communities may oppose the formation of a government on a metropolitan scale because they 
have no desire to help finance central city infrastructure or the cost of providing social and 
economic support for those less affluent inner-city residents.158 Thus, it may be instructive to 
examine some of the reasons why French lawmakers viewed the creation of metropolises more 
favorably than their counterparts in the United States. 
 A number of commentators have argued that the French métropole should be instituted and 
strengthened for the following reasons: (1) enhancement of territorial competitiveness and 
economic growth; (2) increased political cohesion at the metropolitan level through an integrated 
metropolitan structure; (3) opportunities for greater innovation; and (4) the necessity to build more 
sustainable and coherent metropolitan spaces. The article next discusses these views that favor the 
creation of the metropolis. 
 Large-scaled urbanized areas have become the primary geographic unit underpinning the 
global economy.159  If the economy operates over the larger metropolitan area encompassing more 
territory than just the geographical area of the central city, a broader range of private and public 
actors can be mobilized to generate economic growth.160 Metropolitan economies of scale are said 
to be the pillars of industrial policy in Italy as well as in France because they enable networking 
and the building of innovation systems on a territorial basis.161  The Paris métropole (Métropole 
du Grand Paris, MGP), the first French inter-communal structure that combined the central city 
and its suburbs, for example, can spur new economic growth by demonstrating its commitment to 
further science, technology, and market linkages as part of its economic strategy to create new 
companies and jobs.162   
 Political structures integrated on a metropolitan-wide basis possess the advantage of being 
able to set a coherent political agenda that can promote economic development, protect the 
environment, and improve social cohesion.163 A metropolis should be able to strengthen inter-
communal cooperation that will vitalize the region’s territorial competitiveness and 
attractiveness.164  Paris’s transformation from a city center and outlying suburbs into a métropole 
grew out of territorial coalitions that sought to strengthen the role of Paris as a major world city.165  
Operating on a metropolitan scale was viewed as necessary to attract State investment in large 
infrastructure projects costing billions of euros, such as the light-rail network to link the Paris 
region’s communes in a circular orbit.166 Major cities are now positioning themselves as global 
cities that spearhead economic development for their wider region.167 
 The issue of innovation has become framed at the metropolitan level.168  The European 
Council, meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, in March 2000, laid out the so-called “Lisbon Strategy” that 
called for the integration and coordination of research activities to foster innovation as a key 
component of economic policy.169 This document cautioned that the Lisbon Strategy objectives 
should be pursued in a flexible and decentralized manner.170 
 Innovation stems from mobilizing the activities of a diverse group of people whether from 
business, the government, or universities.171 These actors frequently connect through networks 
better facilitated on a broader basis than the geographical jurisdiction of one local government.172  
In addition, the specialization and resources necessary to spur innovation will more likely be found 
on a metropolitan scale.173  Innovation has been found to be overwhelmingly present in 
metropolitan areas where it is accompanied by strong human capital, modern infrastructure, and 
places that prize quality.174 
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 A metropolitan-wide planning framework can also improve the quality of life in urban 
areas and create a more sustainable environment. More coherent metropolitan spaces can be built 
when guided by a larger territorial plan that extends beyond the reach of one municipality. The 
European Commission’s Initiative on Smart Cities and Communities calls for integrated planning 
as a key component to achieve greater sustainability in the areas of urban mobility, the built 
environment, and infrastructure.175  Integrated planning, according to the Commission, will 
succeed only if it involves “greater collaboration within and across traditional administrative and 
industry boundaries.”176  Planning on a metropolitan scale enables setting aside areas for parks and 
open space buffers to improve sustainability and livability in dense urban areas.177  In the absence 
of such planning, uncontrolled development takes place.178  Metropolitan-wide planning should 
result in connected greenways spanning a number of municipalities as well as prevent parochial 
land use policies that thwart balanced, reasonable growth management.179 
 
IV. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTS’ FUTURE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH MÉTROPOLE 
 Some of the developments that led to the creation of the French métropole have previously 
been traced in the article.  A complete analysis of the benefits and detriments of metropolitan 
governance are beyond the scope of the article, but it seems likely that more metropolitan-wide 
governmental structures will be created in other countries.  The article next addresses what 
conditions, given the French experience, might pave the way to greater adoption of this form of 
governance.  
A. INTER-MUNICIPAL PUBLIC BODIES TO AMELIORATE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF 
MUNICIPAL FRAGMENTATION THROUGH JOINT MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS ON A 
METROPOLITAN SCALE 
 Cooperation among the French communes over many decades to combine resources was a 
key factor in the development of the concept of a métropole.  Due to the small size of the 
communes and the significant number of them, inter-municipal cooperation became a necessity 
for the provision of needed public services and goods.  Authorization for the creation of inter-
communal structures, which operate on a greater economy of scale than the communes, facilitated 
joint communal projects and services. By working together, the communes most likely built 
stronger relationships among themselves and came to realize the benefits of inter-municipal 
cooperation.  Thus, from the French experience, one can surmise that metropolitan governance can 
best be built upon pre-existing cooperative arrangements among municipalities. 
 In particular, the creation of the public institution of inter-communal cooperation (EPCI) 
with general powers and tax-raising ability established a successful prototype for the later 
métropole. Still lacking institutional status as a fully operational local government, the French 
metropolis follows the path of the EPCIs.180  In fact, with the exception of Lyon, a fully fledged 
local authority that exercises extensive powers over the communes within its territorial reach,181 
most French metropolises take the form of the EPCI with taxing powers.182  Metropolises have 
been described as “EPCIs that bring together communes in a contiguous and uninterrupted unit to 
form an entity of over 400,000 inhabitants, in an urban area of 650,000 inhabitants.”183 Marseille’s 
metropolis was formed by the merger of six EPCIs into a single EPCI structure.184  
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 In the United States, nearly all the states have enacted enabling legislation that authorizes 
intergovernmental cooperation.185  In some instances, cities have joined together to create a 
separate public authority to undertake a joint project on their behalf.186 Voluntary regional councils 
of government, regional planning agencies, and metropolitan planning organizations, also exist.187 
Nonetheless, the latter primarily provide advice on regional planning rather than carry out 
metropolitan-wide functions.188  Only the Portland, Oregon’s Metropolitan Service District 
(Metro) and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council operate on a scale comparable to the 
métropole.189  Instead, the states rely upon single-purpose regional agencies, which generally do 
not interact with the citizenry, to address problems arising from fragmented local governments.190   
 Due to their narrow focus on the provision of only one public service, single-purpose 
agencies have been criticized for failing to coordinate and implement their activities with other 
governmental entities.191  In effect, single-purpose regional bodies undercut rather than promote 
the type of municipal cooperation that would lead to creation of metropolitan-wide governance.192  
In sharp contrast, the EPCIs, formed as “public administrative bodies for intermunicipal 
cooperation . . . with their own tax system,” are general-purpose bodies deemed essential for the 
promotion of cooperation rather than competition among cities and towns.193   
 
B. BELIEF THAT METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE MAKES URBAN CENTERS MORE 
ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 Since the 1960s the desirability of building metropolitan frameworks has been actively 
debated in France.194  Various decentralization policies and high-profile national reports, such as 
the Balladur Report, have kept alive the issue of finding the right balance between national, 
regional, and local authority.195  Paris’s success as a global city spurred initiatives to create strong 
metropolitan governments in other French regional urban areas to both counteract Paris’s 
dominance and to make them competitive in European and international economies.196 This policy, 
known as “métropoles d’equilibre,” of counterbalancing Paris’s predominance by strengthening 
other regional centers, resulted in the creation, in 1963, of a State agency, known as DATAR 
(délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale) (Delegation for Territorial 
Development and Regional Actions),197 that stimulated metropolitan planning.198 Thinking and 
planning beyond the municipal order appears to have been widely accepted as necessary to tackle 
agglomeration effects.199 Pro-metropolitan advocacy served to justify urban reforms and the 
creation of the EPCIs.200 
 In contrast, in the United States, little debate occurs about the complexities of finding the 
right-sized metropolitan or municipal structures.  In public policy areas outside of the federal 
domain, the states as sovereign bodies possess the freedom to develop their own local 
governmental structures and metropolitan preferences.201  The federal government’s dismantling, 
in 1996, of its Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which had conducted 
studies on intergovernmental relations among federal, state, and local units of government, 
demonstrated its lack of interest in intergovernmental coordination.202 The federal government, 
however, has made some attempts to encourage regional planning by making federal transportation 
funding contingent upon the creation of metropolitan planning organizations.203 Non-public bodies 
fill some of the metropolitan debate void. The Brookings Institution, a nonprofit policy 
organization, through its Metropolitan Policy Program, serves as a strong advocate for 
metropolitan-wide solutions to urban problems.204 
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C. SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR METROPOLITAN 
GOVERNANCE 
 The French government’s willingness to spearhead and experiment with metropolitan-wide 
solutions to municipal fragmentation led to the eventual creation of the métropole. The French 
Ministry of the Interior, responsible for relations between the State and local governments, 
possesses the institutional clout to set urban policy.205 DATAR, as a State planning agency, was 
actively involved in promoting metropolitan-wide solutions to urban problems; it favored, for 
example, the creation of a Greater Paris planning project that launched a vast transport 
infrastructure project in 2007.206 
As outlined earlier in the article, numerous decentralization reform movements occurred 
over the past fifty years.  Different institutional forms of inter-municipal cooperation evolved to 
address the effects of agglomeration.207 It has been hypothesized that “the potential for 
metropolitan reform increases with the degree of prior institutionalisation of the local political 
scene.”208  
 The French national government has also shown a willingness to intervene, if necessary, 
to ensure the creation of integrated metropolises. 209  Such was the case with respect to Marseille 
when Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, in 2012, firmly steered the creation of the Aix-Marseille-
Provence metropolis. 210  The French State, however, has shown flexibility in letting local 
governments shape the metropolis’s contours. 211  In Lyon, an integrated métropole, exercising the 
powers of both a municipality and a department, is in place due to a prominent role played by the 
pre-existing Urban Community and an alliance formed by two leading local politicians.212 
Marseille, on the other hand, remains as an EPCI, a more loosely formed metropolis with weaker 
control over its six territorial components, following their merger as six EPCIs into one. 213
 In the United States, state legislatures have shown little willingness to debate the issues of 
centralized metropolitan planning and the creation of multi-purpose metropolitan governments to 
undertake regional functions such as transit, housing, solid waste disposal, sewerage, water supply, 
wastewater treatment, and climate change adaptation.214  Local politicians can be expected to resist 
metropolitan controls because they weaken or displace their power.215 State legislators have 
withered in the face of such vested interests when joined by other powerful localism coalitions, 
including prosperous suburbanites, county officials, and those seeking to distance themselves from 
inner-city poverty and racial minorities.216  Suburban legislators, for example, put an end to the 
“Boston—1915” metropolitan campaign that proposed a metropolitan body with purview over 
land-use planning, zoning, transportation, and parks.217   
 
D. RECEPTIVITY TO PLANNING AS AN INSTRUMENT TO MANAGE URBAN GROWTH AND 
IMPROVE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 Planning on a metropolitan-wide basis underpins the rationale for metropolitan 
governance. The problems of coordinating regional functions between the City of Paris and the 
suburban municipalities surrounding it, received the attention of the State as early as 1910.218 
Recognizing cross-communal interdependence between Paris and its Seine suburbs, the 
department of the Seine steered the coordination of urban policies and organized inter-municipal 
service delivery.219  It “staked its legitimacy on coordinating urban planning policy.”220 By the 
1930s, the State’s intervention in urban planning resulted in the creation of its own bureaucratic 
units devoted to the development of the Parisian region.221  Growth management was not limited 
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to Paris.  In 1919, the enactment of national legislation required municipalities of over 10,000 
inhabitants to develop a growth plan.222  France has been considered a “pioneer in the field of 
spatial policies” since the 1960s.223 
 Urban planning entails faith in experts drawn from a number of different fields, including 
transport, engineering, housing, demography, and urban planning.  The coordination of urban 
policy between departmental and municipal governments resulted in an accumulation of 
knowledge about the phenomenon relating to urban interdependence that led to the elaboration of 
urban development laws.224  The reliance upon and sharing of this urban expertise undoubtedly 
assisted in the development of new French forms of urban governance.225 
 In the United States, metropolitan governance in which a general-purpose regional 
government exercises control over urban planning and the imposition of growth management 
controls for the entire region has yet to materialize.226  Federal aid formulas and other incentives, 
however, have resulted in some metropolitan integration such as the sharing of an airport between 
Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas.227  Because land uses in the United States are regulated largely at 
the local level, “no European-style central government . . . can make regions do right and eat their 
planning spinach.”228  In the 1990s, a state-directed approach to urban planning was viewed as 
fairly new,229 but today more states now require planning.230  Thus, more credence in the 
desirability of urban planning is emerging in the United States, albeit slowly. 
 
E. DECISION MAKERS WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE 
 In France, the practice of multiple office holding can result in a better understanding of 
urban governance issues.  Michel Mercier and Gérard Collomb, for example, were both members 
of the national Senate and prominent local politicians, serving as Mayor of Lyon and President of 
Urban Community/Grand Lyon, respectively, at the time they brokered the creation of the Lyon 
metropolis.231  Nicolas Sarkozy served as Mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Minister of the Budget, 
Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Finances before his election to the French presidency.232  
Whereas many early United States presidents served at the state and local levels of government 
before assuming national office, mass media has enabled the election of federal office holders 
without any prior experience at the local level.  Thus, the French form of governance would seem 
to outpace that of the United States in the election of officials with an understanding of urban 
growth issues. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 Nations depend upon general-purpose local governments to perform a range of public 
services and to administer regulations in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.  
These governmental units, often formed during eras of less agglomeration, frequently do not 
possess the territorial size to undertake these functions expeditiously.  Today, many governmental 
operations must be conducted on a regional basis overlapping municipal boundary lines.  In 
France, the State has authorized communes, French municipalities, to create inter-communal 
structures tasked with performing joint services or projects on their behalf.  Although these inter-
communal public institutions are similar to public authorities in the United States, they are likely 
to be more closely connected to municipal governance because they perform functions delegated 
to them by the communes. In addition, many French inter-communal bodies provide a range of 
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services whereas in the United States most metropolitan public authorities are assigned only one 
function, such as transit service or the supply of water.   
 Over several decades, France’s experience with inter-communal cooperative efforts led to 
the creation of the French métropole, a more integrated inter-communal entity created specifically 
to perform governmental functions in large urban, metropolitan areas.  Through several 
decentralization movements, a rationale emerged for the delegation of more powers to a general-
purpose public institution operating on a metropolitan-wide basis.  French national leaders strongly 
believed that State decentralization of power would result in greater territorial competitiveness and 
economic growth.  To their way of thinking, sub-national units of government were in the best 
position to stimulate innovation given political and economic interdependency on a metropolitan 
scale. In addition, the greater territorial reach of a metropolitan public body was felt to expedite 
the institution of a framework to build a more sustainable physical environment.   
 France’s experience with inter-communal structures, including the métropole, prove 
instructive.  The knowledge gained from French decentralization reforms sheds light on the type 
of developments that facilitate the institution of metropolitan-wide governance.  The article argues 
that the following conditions, based on the French experience, most likely produce greater 
receptivity to the institutionalization of the metropolis: (1) the existence of joint municipal 
cooperative activities overseen by an inter-municipal public institution that gains respect through 
effective and transparent operations; (2) belief that the metropolis will improve economic 
competitiveness by operating on the same scale as the regional networks underlying the global 
economy; (3) State support and incentives for inter-communal cooperation; (4) willingness to rely 
on more centralized planning and expertise to make metropolitan government competitive; and (5) 
political leaders willing to promote metropolitan governance through their understanding of its 
advantages.  While each country will pave its own particular path to metropolitan governance, 
France’s experience provides useful insights on both the circumstances that enhance the creation 
of metropolitan governance as well as the obstacles its proponents face.   
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